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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
ACTION-ACTIONS FOR DECLARATIONS OF RIGHTS WITHOUT OTHER
RELIEF---RIGHT OF LESSEE, OBLIGATED BY LEASE TO PAY TAXES, TO OBTAIN
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AS TO VALIDITY OF TAX IMPOSED UPON THE
DEMISED PREMISEs-The recent Kansas case of Boeing Airplane Company
v. Board of County Commissioners of Sedgwick County1 was one calling
for a declaratory judgment as to the validity of certain taxes assessed
against leased premises. Plaintiff was the lessee of, and held an option
1164 Kan. 149, 188 P. (2d) 429 (1947). Although Burch, J., wrote the opinion for
the majority, he also wrote a dissenting opinion, concurred in by Wedell and Hoch,
JJ.
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to buy, the real property in question which was owned by the Reconstruction Finance Company as successor to the Defense Plant
Corporation. By the terms of the lease, plaintiff was obligated to pay
any taxes which were lawfully assessed against the demised premises.
The defendants had entered the property in question upon their tax
books for the years 1944 to 1946 as the property of the plaintiff, notwithstanding the fact that the legal title was in the Reconstruction
Finance Company, apparently acting on the assumption that taxes were
to be levied and collected in the same manner as on privately owned
property. The lessee's protest against the assessment was denied both
by the defendant and the state commission of revenue and taxation,
despite the claim that the tax levy was invalid. 2 Plaintiff then sought
a declaratory judgment as to the validity of the tax levy, impleading
the Reconstruction Finance Company as a defendant.3 The principal
defendants demurred, claiming that the court had no jurisdiction on the
ground that the petition did not disclose any controversy within the
purview of the local declaratory judgment act 4 and also because there
was no privity of interest between the lessee and the taxing authorities
over the taxation of property belonging to another. The district court
sustained jurisdiction but upheld the demurrer on the second ground.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Kansas, that court, with three judges
dissenting, declared that the lower court was without jurisdiction to
entertain a declaratory judgment proceeding of that character and
ordered the appeal dismissed.
The instant case presents, for the first time in the United States,
an inquiry as to whether a lessee, under an obligation to pay lawful
taxes, could secure declaratory relief as to the validity of taxes assessed
against real estate not owned by the lessee. The decision of the Kansas
court to the effect that such a lessee may not, is unfortunate in two
respects. It is contrary to the progressive attitude of declaratory judgment acts in general and to the Kansas statute in particular, as well as
contrary to views expressed in ordinary law actions involving the same
subject wherein a much more rigid attitude toward the problem could
have been rationalized on a sounder basis.
In the first place, it is a well established legal principle that a lessee
2 The claim of invalidity was based on the argument that U. S. C. A., Tit. 15.
§ 610, permitting taxation of property belonging to the Reconstruction Finance
Company, was in conflict with the act admitting Kansas into the Union, 12 Stat. 127.
§ 3, para. 6; with the joint resolution of the Kansas legislature accepting statehood,
Kan. Laws 1862, Ch. 6; and also with Kan. Gen. Stat. 1937, § 79-201(5), exempting
property owned, used by, and belonging exclusively to the United States government.
3 The Reconstruction Finance Company filed an answer which did no more than

admit all the facts alleged in plaintiff's petition.
4 Kan. Gen. Stat. 1935, § 60-3127 et seq.
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who agrees to pay all taxes levied on the demised premises thereby
assumes only to pay such taxes as may be legal and valid. The leading
case on that point is Clark v. Coolidge5 which, ironically enough, was also
decided in Kansas. Conversely, taxing bodies have, at times, availed
themselves of such a contract between lessor and lessee to justify a levy
of taxes directly against the lessee. In New York Guaranty and
Indemnity Company v. Tacoma Railway & Motor Company,6 for example,
the court said: "We are of the opinion that the motor company's
exclusive possession and enjoyment for the period of 25 years of the
leased portion of the power plant site, with a covenant binding it to pay
the taxes thereon 'fulfills the condition of being owner' for the purposes
of taxation." '7 The conclusion is irresistible that if the lessee who
assumes the payment of taxes is bound to pay only such taxes as are
valid, and if he may be directly coerced into paying such taxes, he
should, as a matter of natural justice, be permitted to enter a direct
contest to determine the validity thereof.
This general proposition has, as a matter of fact, been subscribed to
by the courts. In Pursell v. Mayor, etc., of the City of New York,8 the
lessee had paid an assessment for local improvements by reason of a
covenant in his lease binding him to pay all such assessments. On
application by his landlord, pending at the time payment was made, the
assessment was set aside. It was held proper for the lessee to have the
benefit of that decision and to recover the amount of the taxes so paid.
There is considerable significance in the remark there made to the
effect that ". . . the plaintiff was not the party assessed, nor was he
the petitioner in the proceeding to vacate the assessment; but he had a
valuable leasehold interest in the property, upon which the assessment
was an apparent lien, and he was also bound by the covenants in his
lease to pay all the assessments. He was, therefore, the real party in
interest in the proceedings instituted by his landlord to vacate the assessment. He might have instituted them himself . . . "9
The case of In re Burke'0 possesses much the same effect for there
the court said: "Nor, if a lessee is bound by his lease to pay an assess5 8 Kan. 189 (1871), cited in Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant (Callaghan & Co.,
Chicago, 1912), Vol. 1, § 143(3). To the same effect are the cases of Scott v. Society
of Russian Israelites, 59 Neb. 571, 81 N. W. 624 (1900), Hart v. Town of Cornwall,
14 Conn. 228 (1841), and New York El. R. Co. v. Manhattan R. Co., 63 How. Pr. 14
(New York, 1881). See also Underhill, Law of Landlord and Tenant (T. H. Flood &
Co., Chicago, 1909), Vol. 2, § 606.
693 F. 51 (1899).

7 93 F. 51 at 57.
8 85 N. Y. 330 (1881).
9 85 N. Y. 330 at 333.
10 62 N. Y. 224 (1875).
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ment laid, can I perceive a difference between him and an owner, in his
right to take this proceeding . . .

Either the owner whose title may be

clouded by an illegal assessment, or a lessee who is under covenant to
pay an assessment, is aggrieved when an invalid assessment is made . . .
The provision of law for this special proceeding to vacate was meant to
afford an early, speedy and cheap mode of testing the legality. It is
open to any one, owner or lessee, who is likely to be put to litigation
and expense by reason of it."11 The reactionary attitude of the majority
of the court in the instant case is pointed up, and its incongruity
heightened, by the sharp contrast with such liberal language expressed
over seventy years ago.
Cognizance should also be taken of an additional factor, to-wit: the
plaintiff was not only lessee but in addition had an option to buy the
demised property involved in the instant case. A similar interest was
held sufficient to warrant a declaratory judgment in Ken Realty Company
v. Johnson,2 wherein it was decided that an original complaint to enjoin
the levying of an ad valorem tax against realty occupied by the plaintiff
under a contract to purchase from the United States government contained a sufficient demand for judgment to include within its scope a
declaration of right based upon such possessory interest. If it should
be argued that such a right is only a contingent one, the argument must
be countered with the assertion that in many instances "even if a right
claimed is contingent upon the happening of some future event, its present
determination may serve a very real practical need of the parties for
guidance in their future conduct."' 3 The Connecticut case of Sigal v.
Wise, 4 says this very thing for it was there pointed out that a construction of declaratory judgment statutes which would "exclude from
the field of their operation the determination of rights, powers, privileges
and immunities which are contingent upon the happening or not happening of some future event would hamper their useful operation.""
The Kansas Declaratory Judgment Act, like similar statutes, is
avowedly remedial and states that its purpose is "to afford relief from
the uncertainty and insecurity attendant upon controversies over legal
rights, without requiring one of the parties interested so to invade the
rights asserted by the other as to entitle him to maintain an ordinary
action therefor; and it is to be liberally interpreted and administered,
11 62 N. Y. 224 at 22S.
1246 F. Supp. 408 (1942).
13 See annotation in 87 A. L. R. 1216 to Heller v. Shapiro, 20S Wis. 310, 242 N. W.
174, 87 A. L. R. 1201 (1932).
14 114 Conn. 297, 158 A. 891 (1932), noted in 41 Yale L. J. 1090.
15 114 Conn. 297 at 302, 158 A. 891 at 893.
I
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with a view to making the courts more serviceable to the people.' '16 It
is futile to have a legislature subscribing to progressive principles of
legal administration of that character if the courts will not translate
legislative intent into practical reality. The declaratory judgment is a
lusty infant of the law. It is fitting that its growth and development
should be zealously guarded so as to insure as nearly perfect a specimen
as possible when it comes of age. But it is quite another thing to
positively retard its growth and development by decisions that will cirThe
cumscribe its natural scope and attenuate its potential force.'"
instant case stands as a refutation of the basic reasons which prompted
the adoption of the declaratory judgment device. It is, therefore, not
unreasonable to hope that the principles for which it stands will be
rejected by subsequent decisions.
I. STEIN

CHARITIES--CREATION,

EXISTENCE, AND VALIDITY-WHETHER

OR NOT

GIFT IN TRUST TO CLOISTERED CONVENT MEETS REQUIREMENT THAT TRUST
FOR CHARITY MUST DISCLOSE PUBLIC BENEFIT TO BE VALID-The vexatious

question of whether a gift in trust for the benefit of a cloistered convent
amounts to a valid charitable gift was placed squarely before the
Chancery Division of the High Court of Judicature in the English case
of In re Coats' Trusts.' In that case, a sum of money was held by trustees
under a declaration of trust with direction to apply the income for the
purposes of a Roman Catholic cloistered convent but if such purposes
were not charitable then the trustees were directed to apply the trust
fund to another religious community whose purposes were admittedly
charitable. Upon request by the trustees for directions, the evidence
showed that the convent consisted of a group of twenty strictly cloistered
and contemplative nuns who devoted their lives to self-sanctification within
their convent and who engaged in no exterior corporeal works of mercy.
16

Kan. Gen. Stat. 1935, § 60-3127.

17 Perhaps the most adequate expression of the purpose and efficacy of the declaratory judgment proceeding was made by Edson R. Sunderland, "A Modern Revolution
in Remedial Rights--The Declaratory Judgment," 16 Mich. L. Rev. 69 at 76 (1917).
where he states: ". . . if the courts could operate as diplomatic instead of
belligerent agencies, less hesitation would be felt over recourse to them, and less
strain would be put upon the friendly relations of the parties. To ask the courts
merely to say whether you have certain contract rights against the defendant is a
very different thing from demanding damages or an injunction against him. When
you ask for a declaration of right only, you treat him as a gentleman. When you
ask for coercive relief you treat him as a wrongdoer. That is the whole difference
between diplomacy and war; the former assumes that both parties wish to do right,
the latter is based on an accusation of wrong . . . It makes the law suit a cooperative proceeding in which the court merely assists the parties to settle their differences by stating the rules of law which govern them."
1 Sub nom. Coats v. Cilmour, [1948] Ch. 1.
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The way of life of these nuns, however, was said to be a source of great
edification to other Catholics and indeed, in innumerable cases, to nonCatholics, leading them to a higher estimation of spiritual things and to
a greater striving after their own spiritual perfection as well as to
inculcate in such persons a greater estimation of the value and importance
of the things which were eternal than they would have had if they had
2
The court summed up the evidence
not these examples before them.
as tending to indicate that the nuns in question, by means of their private
worship, prayers, and meditations, caused the intervention of God to
bring about "the spiritual improvement of the public (both Catholic and
non-Catholic)" and also provided "an example of self-denial and concentration on the life of the spirit tending to the spiritual edification of
the public."' Despite such evidence and contrary to
* members of
the contention of counsel for the convent, that in determining whether
a particular religious purpose was for the benefit of the public the court
should assume the tenets of the particular religion to be true, it was held
that the purposes of the convent in question were not charitable, the
benefit to the public being too incidental and indirect, hence the trust
over was called into operation.
Ever since Lord Macnaghten's decision in the case of The Commis4
sioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v. Pemsel, legally
recognized charities have been classified into four broad categories, to-wit:
"trusts for the relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of education;
trusts for the advancement of religion; and trusts for other purposes
beneficial to the community, not falling under any of the preceding
Subsequent decisions have paid service to the proposition that
heads. '"
for a gift in trust to be for a charity "there must be some public
The gift
purpose-something tending to the benefit of the community."'
its
reaching
in
court,
the
for
issue
in the instant case failed on this very
7
effect
the
to
Manners
v.
decision, relied upon dicta in the case of Cocks
that a gift to a cloistered convent could not be a charitable gift as it would
be lacking in any aspect of public benefit.
The law relating to charities, however, has developed substantially
during the past century and would hardly appear to support the decision
2 See affidavit by Cardinal Griffin, set out in [1948] Ch. 1 at p. 9.

8 [1948] Ch. 1 at p. 10.
4 [1891] App. Cas. 531.
5 Ibid., at p. 583.
6 See In re Foveaux, [1895] L. R. 2 Ch. 501 at p. 504. But for an interesting discussion of the proposition that a showing of public benefit should not be necessary
as to gifts for the advancement of religion, see F. H. Newark, "Public Benefit and
Religious Trusts," 69 Law Quart. Rev. 234 (1946).
7 [1871] L. R. 12 Eq. Cas. 573.
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in the instant case. It is true that the English courts at one time held
that bequests for the saying of masses for the repose of the soul of the
deceased testator were to be deemed illegal since the gift tended to
propagate a religion other than the one recognized by the state." After
the passage of the Roman Catholic Charities Act,9 such gifts were still
10
This last
held invalid, but on the ground of being superstitious uses.
mentioned view was corrected in Bourne v. Keane," but it was not until
the decision in the case of In re Caus12 that the court finally held that
gifts of that character were charitable. The former decisions to the
contrary were there declared to be based upon "insufficient and incorrect
13
and upon the
information with regard to the character of the rite,"
false assumption that, as the dominant purpose was to benefit the testator,
the gift could not be charitable, egoism being the direct antithesis of
charity. The court there received evidence as to the nature and purpose
of the Mass,' 4 accepted the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church to
be a true exposition,'- and arrived at the conclusion that as the gift was
designed for the advancement of religion it bestowed a public benefit,
hence was charitable in character. The courts of Ireland also, at one
time, indicated that there was no public benefit which could be shown by
legal evidence,' 6 but that view was likewise expressly overruled in the
case of O'Halon v. Logue.'1
In this country, trusts for masses have generally been held to be
charitable in character,' 8 and, since gifts to charity are looked upon with
favor, every presumption consistent with the language used will be
s Cary v. Abbot, 7 Ves. Jun. 490, 32 Eng. Rep. 198 (1802).

92 and 3 Win. IV, c. 115 (1832) ; Halsbury, Laws of England, Vol. IV. p. 132.
lOWest v. Shuttleworth, 2 My. & K. 684, 39 Eng. Rep. 1106 (1835); Heath v.
Chapman, 2 Drewry 417, 61 Eng. Rep. 781 (1854).
11 [1919] App. Cas. 815.
12 Sub. nom. Lindeboom v. Camille, [1934] Ch. 162.
13 Ibid., at p. 169.
14 The evidence indicated that every Mass, "on whatever occasion used, is offered
to God in the name of the church, to propitiate His anger, to return thanks for His
benefits, and to bring down His blessings upon the whole world." It was said to be
impossible, according to the doctrine of the church, "that a Mass can be offered for
the benefit of one or more individuals living or dead to the exclusion of the general
objects included by the church." See In re Caus, [1934] Ch. 162 at p. 167.
15 On that score, the court said it would refuse "to entertain an inquiry as to the
truth or soundness of any religious doctrine, provided it is not contrary to morals
or contains nothing contrary to law." [1934] Ch. 162 at p. 168.
16 See Attorney-General v. Delaney, [1875] Ir.R. 10 C. L. 104.
17 [1906] 1 Ir.R. 247.
is Sedgwick v. National Savings & Trust Co., 130 F. (2d) 440 (1942) ; Hoeffer v.
Clogan, 171 Ill. 462, 49 N. E. 527 (1898) ; Harrison v. Brophy, 59 Kan. 1, 51 P. 883
(1898) ; Coleman v. O'Leary, 114 Ky. 388, 70 S. W. 1068 (1902) ; Webster v. Sughrow,
69 N. H. 380, 45 A. 139 (1898) ; Holland v. Alcock, 108 N. Y. 312, 16 N. E. 305
(1888) ; Sherman v. Baker, 20 R. I. 446, 40 A. 11 (1898) ; In re Kavanaugh's Estate,
143 Wis. 90, 126 N. W. 672 (1910).
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indulged in to sustain them. 19 It being a political as well as a legal
principle that there shall be no established religion,- and government
being forbidden to participate in the support of or dissemination of
religion of any kind, all religious societies in the United States must
depend upon the eleemosynary contributions of individuals for their
support. Whenever the end of such gifts is truly religious, the law ought
not stand in the donor's way and should hold such donations as being
really charitable.2 '
The decision in the case of In re Kavanaugh's
2
Estate ' is typical, for it was stated therein, in reply to the contention
that no public benefit was afforded by the saying of masses that according
"to the doctrine of the Catholic Church as established by the proof in
this case, the whole church profits by every mass . . . 'The individuals
who participate in the fruits of this mass are the person or persons for
whom the mass is offered, all those who assist at the mass, the celebrant
himself, and for all mankind, within or without the fold of the church.'
So it seems clear upon reason and authority . . . that a bequest for
masses is a 'charitable bequest,' and valid as such, although the repose
of the souls of particular persons be mentioned. 22
According to the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church, the benefit
from a gift for masses is two-fold; spiritual, by the infusing of grace
into the soul of man, and material, by the Divine bounty bestowed upon
mankind. Another benefit may be found in that the mere knowledge
there will be a rendition of the Mass edifies a large group of persons,
Catholics and non-Catholics alike, leading them to "a higher estimation
of spiritual things and to a greater striving after their own spiritual
perfection." '23 If this is so, it seems inconsistent for a court to hold that
a gift to a cloistered convent is not charitable in character for the same
type of benefit is conferred by the prayers of the devote nuns as results
from the saying of the Mass. The court would seem to misconstrue the
whole object and purpose of nuns such as those in the instant case, in
devoting their lives to self-sanctification in strict seclusion, when it holds
that such purposes are for the benefit of the nuns alone and not for any
appreciable portion of the public. This view "postulate[s] egoism as
the note of the monastic life." '24 It is most unlikely that the prayers
of such nuns are directed only to the procurement of blessing for themselves, but in any event their godly lives set an example and edification
to the whole Church, if not to the entire public.
19 Carlstrom v. Frackelton, 263 Ill. App. 250 (1931).
20 Powers v. First National Bank of Corsicana, 138 Tex. 604, 161 S. W. (2d) 273
(1942).
21143 Wis. 90, 126 N. W. 672 (1910).
22 143 Wis. 90 at 98, 126 N. W. 672 at 675.

23 See In re Coats' Trusts, [1948] Ch. 1 at p. 9.
24 Maguire v. Attorney-General, [1943] Ir. R. 238 at 247.
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Judges and lawyers cannot be expected to be theologians, nor is it
desirable, in this age of acute differences as to religious beliefs, that they
should be. But if there is to be no discrimination over religions, it would
seem to be better policy to adhere to views such as those expressed in
the Caus and Kavanaugh cases. Under those views, at least, courts will
not be open to the charge that they favor one religion over another.
J. A. SACCONE,

CONTRACTS-REQUISITES
ORIGINAL

AGREEMENT

AND

WHEREBY

VALIDITY-VALIDITY
CONTRACTING

PARTY

OF

JR.

PROVISION

IN

STIPULATES

TO

WAIVE BENEFIT OF STATUTE OF LImITATION-In the recent Massachusetts

case of National Bond & Investment Company v. Flaiger,1 the facts
disclosed that the defendant purchased a car under a conditional sale
contract in 1939 and at that time executed an installment promissory note
to secure the unpaid balance. The note contained a provision to the effect
that all "parties to this note . . . hereby severally waive . . . diligence
in bringing suit against any party hereto," and further authorized the
holder to accelerate payment in case of default. The car was subsequently
repossessed and sold because of default in payment of an installment on
the note and the sale price was applied to reduce the indebtedness, leaving
a deficiency thereon. Suit was brought on the note in 1946, to recover
this balance, to which action the defendant pleaded the statute of
limitation.2 The plaintiff replied that the statute could not be asserted
as the defendant had waived the benefit of its terms, by the language
above quoted, but the defendant contended that such waiver was against
public policy and void. The trial court upheld the defendant's contention,
the appellate court dismissed an appeal therefrom, and the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, on further appeal, also affirmed the
judgment, holding for the first time in that state that agreements in
original obligations never to set up the statute of limitations violate the
public policy underlying the statute.
While it is generally held that parties cannot, by agreement, modify
a law, there is also unanimity of opinion on the point that they may
forego the protection afforded by a particular law provided no principle
of public policy is thereby violated.' It is obvious, therefore, that the
public policy permeating statutes of the kind in question must be clearly
1- Mass. -, 77 N. E. (2d) 772 (1948).
2 Mass. G. L. (Ter. Ed.), Ch. 260, § 2, limits actions to six years after the whole
indebtedness becomes payable. It was applicable to the instant case, as the note in
question had been declared due early in 1940 by acceleration when default occurred.
3 Wells Fargo v. Enright, 127 Cal. 669, 60 P. 439 (1900) ; Quick v. Corlies, 39
N. 3. L. 11 (1876).
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outlined before it is possible to pass on the validity of agreements such
as the one involved in the instant case. Jurists generally consider such
statutes as designed to serve both the needs of individuals and the courts;
affording repose to individuals by preventing fraud and perjury against
defendants handicapped by time-worn memories, paucity of witnesses,
and loss of evidence which might once have existed, while protecting
courts against the sudden descent of a mass of stale claims, thereby
insuring a continuous flow of cases permitting of orderly, careful, and
just determination. There is, however, another factor to be considered
and that is the well-accepted fact that needy men are not essentially free
men, hence will yield to pressure and assent to contractual terms, no
matter how oppressive and unjust, in order that urgent needs may be
satisfied.'
Although the language used in many decisions would seemingly
appear to present a great conflict, if the foregoing criteria are observed,
the cases can be placed in definite categories. In the first group, adequately
represented by the facts of the case under discussion, are cases where
the waiver is attempted at the inception of the original obligation, i.e.
at the time when the need of the debtor can best be exploited by the
creditor. According to the prevailing view, such a waiver will be deemed
contrary to public policy, 5 as is also the case where a renewal is granted
only on condition that the maker forego the protection of the statute.'
In contrast thereto, a second group of cases display a willingness to
declare a waiver of the statute valid on the theory that as the parties
may agree to a shorter period of limitation, less than that prescribed by
statuteJ they may fix a longer term so long as they deal at arms length
4 Gorowitz v. Blumenstein, 184 Misc. 111, 33 N. Y. S. (2d)

179 (1944).
5 Forbach v. Steinfeld, 34 Ariz. 519, 273 P. 66 (1928); Kentucky Coal & Feed Co.
v. MeConkey, 271 Ky. 261, 111 S. W. (2d) 418 (1938); U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty
Co. v. Tafel Electric Co., 262 Ky. 792, 91 S. W. (2d) 42 (1935) ; Bates v. Lockley,
241 Ky. 498, 44 S. W. (2d) 589 (1932) ; Wright v. Gardner, 98 Ky. 454, 33 S. W. 622
(1895); Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Simmons, 177 So. 384 (La. Civ. App.,
1937) ; Pine v. Okoniewski, 256 App. Div. 519, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 13 (1939) ; Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. U. S. Hotel Co., 82 Misc. 632, 144 N. Y. S. 476 (1913) ; Shapley v.
Abbott, 42 N. Y. 443, 1 Am. Rep. 548 (1870) ; Simpson v. McDonald, 142 Tex. 444,
179 S. W. (2d) 239 (1944) ; Young v. Sorenson & Hooper, 154 S. W. 676 (Tex. Civ.
App., 1913); Nunn v. Edminston, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 562, 29 S. W. 1115 (1895). But
see contra: Dexter v. Pierson, 214 Cal. 247, 4 P. (2d) 932 (1931) ; Atlas Finance
Corp. v. Kenny, 68 Cal. App. (2d) 504, 157 P. (2d) 401 (1945). Waiver was limited
to a definite or a reasonable time in Lyndon Savings Bank v. International Co., 78
Vt. 169, 62 A. 50 (1906), but was permitted, in State Trust Co. v. Sheldon, 68 Vt.

259, 35 A. 177 (1896), to extend forever.

6 Steinfeld v. Marteny, 40 Ariz. 116, 10 P. (2d) 367 (1932).
It would seem that
the coercion is as great, at that moment, as it would be when the original loan was
made.
7 Agreements shortening the period have been upheld in Burliew v. Fidelity &
Casualty Co., 276 Ky. 132, 122 S. W. (2d) 990 (1938) ; Lewis v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 190 Mass. 317, 62 N. E. 369 (1902) ; Stewart v. National Council of Knights
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and the period fixed is not unreasonable. Especially is this the case if
the waiver agreement is entered into subsequent to the execution of the
original obligation, provided attention is given to the qualification that
the agreement defers the defense for a definite or reasonable time., There
are cases where the courts have decided that the defense of limitation is
unavailable for so long as the parties may have agreed or, if the contract
is indefinite as to time, then forever.' Most courts, however, will place
a time limit beyond which the waiver will not be effective, either on the
theory that the statute runs against the contract not to plead the statute,"
or suspends the bar for a reasonable time which is measured by the
statute,11 or else on the ground that the contract operates only as a
12
waiver of time already past.
No Illinois reviewing court has, as yet, been called upon to decide
the point raised in the case under discussion, nor has the question of the
validity of a waiver subsequent to the original obligation been posed.' 3
and Ladies, 125 Minn. 512, 147 N. W. 651 (1914); Asel v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 355 Mo. 658, 193 S. W. (2d) 74 (1946) ; Appel v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 159 Misc. 118, 286 N. Y. S. 424 (1935).
8 U. S. v. Curtis Aeroplane Co., 144 F. (2d) 639 (1945) ; Brownrigg v. DeFrees,
196 Cal. 534, 238 P. 714 (1925) ; Jones v. Davis, 65 Cal. App. 164, 223 P. 560 (1924) ;
Kemper v. Industrial Accident Commission, 177 Cal. 618, 171 P. 426 (1918) ; State
Loan Co. v. Cochran, 130 Cal. 245, 62 P. 466 (1900) ; Wells Fargo v. Enright, 127
Cal. 669, 60 P. 439 (1900) ; First National Bank v. Mock, 70 Colo. 517. 203 P. 272
(1921) ; Kellog v. Dickinson, 147 Mass. 432, 18 N. E. 223 (1888) ; Trask v. Weeks,
81 Me. 325, 17 A. 162 (1889) ; Maddux v. Jones, 51 Miss. 531 (1875); Crane v.
French, 38 Miss. 503 (1860) ; Weir v. Silver Bow County, 113 Mont. 237, 124 P.
(2d) 1003 (1942) : Parchen v. Chessman. 49 Mont. 326, 146 P. 469 (1914) ; Bridges
v. Stephens, 132 Mo. 524, 34 S. W. 555 (1896) ; Crocker v. Ireland. 235 App. Div. 760,
256 N. Y. S. 638 (1932); Watertown National Bank v. Bagley, 134 App. Div. 831,
119 N. Y. S. 592 (1909) ; Cecil v. Henderson, 121 N. C. 244, 28 S. E. 481 (1897) ;
Dickson v. Slater Steel Co., 138 Okla. 234, 280 P. 517 (1929) ; McIntosh v. Condron,
20 Pa. Super. 118 (1902) : Moore v. Taylor, 2 Tenn. Ch. App. 556 (1897) : Jordan v.
Jordan, 85 Tenn. 561. 3 S. W. 896 (1887). But see contra: Warren v. Walker, 23
Me. 453 (1884) ; Quick v. Corlies, 39 N. J. L. 11 (1876) ; Noyes v. Hall, 28 Vt. (2
Williams) 645 (1856).
9 Warren v. Walker, 23 Me. 453 (1884) ; Quick v. Corlies, 39 N. J. L. 11 (1876)
Lyndon Savings Bank v. International Co., 78 Vt. 169, 62 A. 50 (1906) ; State Trust
Co. v. Sheldon, 68 Vt. 259, 35 A. 177 (1896) ; Noyes v. Hall, 28 Vt. 645 (1856).
10 Cameron v. Cameron, 95 Ala. 344, 10 So. 506 (1891) ; Atlas Finance Corp. v.
Kenny, 68 Cal. App. (2d) 504, 157 P. (2d) 401 (1945) ; Trask v. Weeks, 81 Me. 325,
17 A. 162 (1889) ; Crane v. French, 38 Miss. 503 (1860) ; Parchen v. Chessman, 49
Mont. 326, 146 P. 469 (1914) : Newell v. Clark, 73 N. H. 289. 61 A. 555 (1905)
Watertown National Bank v. Bagley, 134 App. Div. 831, 119 N. Y. S. 592 (1909).
11 First National Bank v. Mock, 70 Colo. 517, 203 P. 272 (1921) ; Bowman v. Paine,
64 Miss. 99, 8 So. 166 (1886) ; Maddux v. Jones, 51 Miss. 531 (1875) ; Bridges v.
Stephens, 132 Mo. 524, 34 S. W. 555 (1896); Cecil v. Henderson, 121 N. C. 244,
28 S. E. 481 (1897) ; McIntosh v. Condron, 20 Pa. Super. 118 (1902).
12 Kellog v. Dickinson, 147 Mass. 432, 18 N. E. 223 (1888) ; Moore v. Taylor, 2
Tenn. Ch. App. 556 (1897).
13 Closest to the point is the case of Conerty v. Riehsteig, 379 Ill. 360, 41 N. E.
(2d) 476 (1942), reversing 308 Ill. App. 321, 31 N. E. (2d) 351 (1941). There the
agreement to remain liable on the original debt, evidenced by a note, either accord-
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There is language in the case of Steen v. Modern Woodmen of America"
which might foreshadow an eventual holding in this state as it pertains
to a waiver contained in the original obligation. The court there, when
deciding the validity of a waiver of a law other than the statute of
limitations, indicated that there should be the utmost liberty of contracting so that, when such contracts have been entered into fairly and
voluntarily, they should be sustained. It has also been held, in this
state, that an agreement limiting the time within which suit may be
brought is valid if the period fixed is not an unreasonable one. 5
These
decisions might indicate that an original waiver of the statute of limitations would be sound, on the theory that if its operation can be shortened
by agreement it can also be extended. But sight should not be lost of
the fact that waiver agreements are usually not truly voluntary ones,
and this point may be seized upon as the determining factor should the
problem ever arise in this state.
H. J. JENNINGS
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DISCLOSING SIMILARITY OF NAmE-Surprisingly enough, the Illinois
Supreme Court was never in a position to construe the degree of proof
required by Section 2 of the Habitual Criminal Act' until the recent case
of People v. Casey 2 afforded that opportunity. The defendant therein,
one Patrick Leo Casey, was tried and convicted on an indictment which
charged grand larceny and, in addition, two prior convictions for felony
in Kansas and Missouri so as to bring the case within the Habitual
Criminal Act.'
At the trial, over objection by the defendant, the state
offered authenticated copies of the records of the prior convictions referring to persons named Patrick Leo Casey and Patrick L. Casey respecing to its terms or "according to any agreement extending time of payment," was
set forth in an accompanying real estate mortgage. Liability beyond the original
period of limitation on the note was denied as the two documents were regarded as
separate undertakings. Had the quoted language been found in the note, the instant
problem would then have been squarely presented.
14 296 Ill. 104, 129 N. E. 546 (1920).
15 Peoria Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. Whitehill, 25 II1. 382 (1861).
1 Il. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 38, § 603.
2399 Ill. 374, 77 N. E. (2d) 812 (1948).
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 38, § 602. No objection was made to the fact that the
prior convictions arose out of the state, probably because of the decision in People
v. Poppe, 394 Ill. 216, 68 N. E. (2d) 254 (1946). But see criticism thereof in 25
CHCAo0-KMNT LAW REVIEW 157.
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tively, but made no attempt to identify the accused as the person referred
to in those records. On the strength thereof, and in the absence of any
contradictory testimony offered by defendant, the jury decided that
Casey was a habitual criminal. On writ of error obtained by defendant, 4
the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial on
the ground that, in view of the imminence of an enhanced penalty such
as is imposed on habitual criminals, it was not improper to require the
state to establish the prior convictions by the same degree of proof
demanded for the substantive offense, to-wit: proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. It likewise held that the presumption of innocence runs as well
to the allegation of prior conviction and is not overcome by authenticated
records, even though declared to be prima facie proof by statute, without
some additional evidence bearing on the question of identity.'
At least twenty-three American jurisdictions have considered this
problem under habitual criminal statutes containing provisions similar
to Section 2 of the Illinois act. When the Illinois Supreme Court was
confronted with the problem, therefore, it had a choice of two wellseasoned views. Thirteen of these states apply the rule adopted in the
instant case,6 but there is a substantial minority where a verdict of guilty
based only upon the prior record plus the presumption of identity arising
from similarity of name will suffice. 7 Judicial harmony on the point is
disrupted not because of any disagreement as to the degree of proof
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 38, §§ 771 and 7802.
5 The fact that similarity of name may raise a presumption of identity of person
in civil cases, Clifford v. Pioneer Fire-Proofing Co., 232 Ill. 150, 83 N. E. 448 (1908),
and Filkins v. O'Sullivan, 79 Il1. 524 (1875), was declared insufficient to rebut the
presumption of innocence in criminal cases: 399 Ill. 374 at 380, 77 N. E. (2d) 812 at
816.
6 Thompson v. State, 66 Fla. 206, 63 So. 423 (1913) ; Kelley v. State, 204 Ind. 612,
185 N. E. 453 (1933) ; State v. Lowe, 235 Iowa 274, 16 N. W. (2d) 226 (1944) ;
State v. Dugas, 170 La. 5, 127 So. 345 (1930) ; State v. Beaudoin, 131 Me. 31, 158 A.
863, 85 A. L. R. 1101 (1932) ; State v. Livermore, 59 Mont. 362, 196 P. 977 (1921) ;
Burnham v. State, 127 Neb. 370, 255 N. W. 48 (1934) ; State v. Adams, 64 N. H. 440,
13 A. 785 (1888) ; People v. Krumme, 161 Misc. 278, 292 N. Y. S. 657 (1936) ; Angus
v. State, 136 Tex. Crim. App. 159, 124 S. W. (2d) 349 (1939) ; State v. Bruno, 69
Utah 444, 256 P. 109 (1927) ; State v. Harkness, 1 Wash. (2d) 530, 96 P. (2d) 460
(1939) ; Green Bay Fish Co. v. State, 186 Wis. 330, 202 N. W. 667 (1925). Note:
only the most recent decision from each jurisdiction is given in this and the succeeding footnote to avoid unnecessary repetition.
7 People v. Williams, 125 Cal. App. 387, 13 P. (2d) 841 (1932) ; Stinson v. State,
65 Ga. App. 592, 16 S. E. (2d) 111 (1941) ; State v. Colopy, 120 Kan. 220, 242 P.
1016 (1926) ; Davis v. Commonwealth, 230 Ky. 732, 20 S. W. (2d) 731 (1929) ;
State v. West, 175 Minn. 516, 221 N. W. 903 (1928) ; McGowan v. State, 200 Miss.
270, 26 So. (2d) 70 (1946) ; State v. Kimbrough, 350 Mo. 609, 166 S. W. (2d) 1077
(1943) ; Pitzer v. State. 69 Okla. Crim. App. 363, 103 P. (2d) 109 (1940) ; Tipton v.
State, 160 Tenn. 664, 28 S. W. (2d) 635 (1930) ; Hefferman v. United States, 50 F.
(2d) 554 (1931).
4
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required,8 but because the courts differ as to what constitutes proof
beyond a reasonable doubt in such cases.
The language of the Iowa Supreme Court in the case of State v.
Smith9 contains an excellent statement of one view, for the court there
said: "The statute provides for the introduction of authenticated copies
of the judgments alleged in proof prima facie thereof. But the state
may not stop there. The identity of the defendant as the person who
suffered such former convictions remains to be proven. We grant that
the identity of names may be some evidence of identity of persons;
but standing alone, it is not enough. Every fact essential to the infliction
of legal punishment upon a human being must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. And it would amount to a travesty to say that a
prima facie case for an increased term of punishment could be made
out . . . by showing the isolated fact that a man passing under that
name had at sometime or other been convicted [elsewhere] . . . The

matter for the jury to determine is the historical fact involved in the
charge, and this they must determine as any other fact in the case.""
No such rhetoric is disclosed in cases expressing the opposite view, but
an excerpt from the California case of People v. Williams"l may be
regarded as typical. The court there noted that "the name of the
defendant who was convicted in Yuba county is identical with that of
the defendant in this action. It is a rule of law that identity of person
may be presumed from identity of name . .

.

also that a presumption

constitutes a species of evidence which, unless controverted, is sufficient
proof of the existence of the fact to which it relates. '"12 The sharp
contrast between the two views thus illustrated is irreconcilable.
Most courts following the reasoning illustrated by the Williams case
impose on the defendant the burden of rebutting the presumption with
evidence.
Thus, the Oklahoma court in Files v. State13 summarily
affirmed the conviction of a defendant who refused to assume that
burden. A more conservative element of the minority, however, looks
rather to the strength of the presumption created as measured in terms
of the surrounding circumstances. In State v. Bizer, 14 for example, the
8 See annotation in 79 A. L. R. 1337, to the case of People v. Reese, 258 N. Y. 89,
179 N. E. 305 (1932), to the effect that it is universally regarded that the fact of
the prior conviction is a substantive element of the offence charged and must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt just as is the case of any other element of the

crime.
9 129 Iowa 709, 106 N. W. 187, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 539 (1906).
10 129 Iowa 709 at 714, 106 N. W. 187 at 189.
11125 Cal. App. 387, 13 P. (2d) 841 (1932).
12 125 Cal. App. 387 at 388, 13 P. (2d) 841 at 842.
13 16 Okla. Crim. 363, 182 P. 911 (1919).
14 113 Kan. 731, 216 P. 303 (1923).
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Supreme Court of Kansas suggested that the certified copy of the record
placed before the jury would inform them of such facts as the nature
of the prior offense, the manner by which it was accomplished, and the
time and place of commission. Where these compare substantially, the
existing presumption of identity would be sufficiently strong to warrant
the jury finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused was the
person named in the record. Similarly, in Hefferman v. United States,15
the authenticated records showed that a person of the same name had
been convicted several times for running a "speakeasy"
in the same
town and at the same address as that charged in the instant indictment.
The Utah court, in State v. Aime,' 6 considered the presumption strong
enough where the name was not a common one, and there was nothing
to indicate that more than one person in the vicinity was known by the
same name." But subsequent cases in the same jurisdictions would seem
to reveal that this conservative view is difficult to apply and is apt to
produce a swing in either direction.'
To say the least, there is logic behind the majority view for, if it
be conceded that the state has the burden of proving the prior conviction
beyond a reasonable doubt, then it follows as a necessary consequence
that the presumption of innocence which favors the accused should
require more than a mere presumption to offset it.19 Certainly that
burden would hardly be discharged by a presumption of fact which, on
its face, is weaker than the legal presumption of innocence. But apart
from logical consistency, the minority view is weak in the practical
sense for, in a jurisdiction where the volume of criminal cases is substantial, a duplication of names is apt to occur frequently so that any
identity of name becomes little more than a mere coincidence, but a
coincidence which might weigh heavily against a defendant such as the
one in the instant case.
This alone should be reason enough to put a well-defined burden on
the prosecution, yet not serve to create an insuperable burden for, in
most instances, proving the identity of a person is neither difficult nor
expensive. It may be established by the testimony of witnesses who have
15 50 F. (2d) 554 (1931).

16 62 Utah 476, 220 P. 704 (1923).
17 See also Belcher v. Commonwealth, 216 Ky. 12, 287 S. W. 550 (1926).
18 Ir State v. Colopy, 120 Kan. 220, 242 P. 1016 (1926). for example, a conviction
resting primarily on identity of name was affirmed. The later Utah case of State v.
Bruno, 69 Utah 444, 256 P. 109 (1927), on the other hand, produced such a retreat
from the rule in the Aime case, cited in note 16, ante, as to amount to a practical
reversal thereof.
19 Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245, 31 S. Ct. 2, 54 L. Ed. 1021, 20 Ann. Cas.
138 (1910); Agnew v. United States, 165 U. S. 36, 17 S. Ct. 225, 41 L. Ed. 624
(1897). See also Wigmore, Evidence, 2d Ed., Vol. V, § 2511.
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known the accused ;2o by the sheriff who took him into custody after the
prior conviction ;21 by the accused's own admission ;22 by the clerk of the
court who read the prior sentence;2" by photographs ;24 or by finger
prints.2 5 Such being the case, the Illinois Supreme Court is to be commended for achieving a rule which is eminently fair to all concerned.
D. V. O'BRIEN
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DECREE-A problem of first impression, presented to the Appellate Court
of the First District in the recent case of Arnold v. Arnold,' required
that court to decide whether or not a divorced wife was entitled to an
increase in alimony upon a showing that her divorced husband had
increased his wealth many times since the date of the original decree.

The plaintiff therein had obtained an absolute divorce in 1931 together
with an allowance of periodic alimony.
Fourteen years later, she
petitioned for an increase of the alimony alleging that while, at the
time of the divorce, the defendant had been employed at a salary oxf

seventy-five hundred dollars a year, he had since made over a million
dollars and would probably receive an income of seventy thousand dollars
for the following year. The master in chancery, after conducting hearings on the petition, recommended a substantial increase in the alimony
allowance but the chancellor granted only a moderate increase on grounds

other than those relating to defendant's newly-acquired affluence. Both
parties appealed from the modification of the decree. The Appellate
Court, however, affirmed the holding on the ground that as plaintiff had
contributed nothing to defendant's acquisition of wealth, and had procured an absolute divorce, she was entitled to only such alimony as was
sufficient to maintain her in the station of life to which she had become
accustomed at the time of the divorce, with an increase therein sufficient
to meet the present high cost of living2 and changes produced by the
20 State v. Howard, 30 Mont. 518, 77 P. 50 (1904) ; State v. Wilmot, 95 Wash. 326,
163 P. 742 (1917).
21 State v. Garrish, - Mo. -, 29 S.W. (2d) 71 (1930).
22 State v. Rusnak, 108 N. J. L. 84, 154 A. 754 (1931).
23 Klein v. United States, 14 F. (2d) 35 (1926).
24 State v. Smith, 128 Ore. 515, 273 P. 323 (1929).
25 People v. Reese, 258 N. Y. 89, 179 N. E. 305, 79 A. L. R. 1329 (1932).
1332 111. App. 586, 76 N. E. (2d) 335 (1947).
2 Gehlbach v. Gehlbach, 219 Ill. App. 503 (1920) ; Brown v. Brown, 209 Mo. App.
416, 239 S. W. 1093 (1922).
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amendment of the federal income tax law redistributing the burden of
taxation on alimony payments.3
While the Illinois legislature has seen fit to provide for modification
of alimony allowances, at least as to those payable periodically, it has
not specified what new facts will warrant an alteration of the original
sum fixed by the court.4 By allowing the trial court to exercise broad
discretionary powers the legislature has left judicial hands untied and
capable of dealing equitably with the varied problems which may arise.
There is indication that when so dealing the court should not act "in a
niggardly manner" 5 but that is far from saying there are no observable
limits on the court's power.
The instant question whether or not to increase the alimony on the
basis of the ex-husband's new wealth, is certainly novel, for Illinois
courts have not previously had occasion to deal therewith directly, but
from what has been said in other Illinois cases it is clear that a change
of circumstance is required.' The phrase "change in circumstance" has
meaning for, unless it be shown, the court will not have jurisdiction to
modify the decree.7 Two elements appear to be essential, to-wit: need
on the part of the ex-wife, and ability on the part of the ex-husband
to pay, 8 although there is dictum to the effect that a change in either
element may be enough." As applied to the instant case, only the second
factor was shown to be present, in the form of a greatly enhanced ability
to pay more alimony, thereby leading to the direct problem as to whether
or not that was enough to justify a modification of the decree.
Not only was the court without Illinois precedents to guide it, but
apparently the problem has been rarely raised elsewhere. There are
3 Jacobs v. Jacobs, 328 Ill. App. 133, 65 N. E. (2d) 588 (1946). But see Russell
v. Russell, 142 F. (2d) 753 (1944), where an increase was denied on the ground that
to grant the same would merely be readjusting the tax burden in a way not intended
by Congress. The court did say, however, that an increase would be proper if the
wife's station in life was lowered and the divorced husband was shown to be able
to pay more.
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 19, § 18, states: "... And the court may, on application,
from time to time, make such alterations in the allowance of alimony and maintenance, and the care, custody and support of the children, as shall appear reasonable and proper." Similar statutes exist in other jurisdictions: Vernier, American
Family Laws, Vol. II, § 106, and Supp. §§ 105-6.
5 Arnold v. Arnold, 332 Ill. App. 586 at 599, 76 N. E. (2d) 335 at 340.
6 Herrick v. Herrick, 319 Ill. 146, 149 N. E. 820 (1925).
7 Cole v. Cole, 142 Ill. 19, 31 N. E. 109, 19 L. R. A. 811 (1892).
8 Smith v. Smith, 334 Ill. 370, 166 N. E. 85 (1929) ; Cahill v. Cahill, 316 Ill. App.
324, 45 N. E. (2d) 69 (1942).
9 Herrick v. Herrick, 319 Ill. 146, 149 N. E. 820 (1925). See also Lay v. Lay, 204
Ill. App. 511 (1917), where the court expressed no uncertainty as to its power to
grant an increase where the petitioner was the aggrieved party, but the petitioner
there merely sought the additional sum to permit her to maintain the station in life
she had occupied prior to the divorce.
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some cases, however, which treat with the matter. In one case brought
to the attention of the court, that of Humbird v. Humbird,1 there is
language tending to support the position claimed for the plaintiff, for the
court talked of maintaining the wife in the style and condition that her
ex-husband's financial position would have "justified her in maintaining
But the basis for upholding the
but for his wrongful conduct.""
increase in alimony granted in that case was not that the ex-wife was
entitled to share in her former spouse's subsequent good fortune so much
as it was that the original allowance was set too low because based on
the temporary condition of the ex-husband's income while in military
service at the time rather than on his normal earning capacity as a
civilian. Attention might have been directed, however, to the Minnesota
case of Erickson v. Erickson 2 wherein the court, after originally fixing
a lump-sum allowance, granted an additional permanent allowance upon
a showing that the ex-husband had become a beneficiary of a trust whereby
his income would become appreciably augmented.' While an Iowa court
indicated that only the most unusual circumstances would ever cause it to
order an increase,' one sitting in New Jersey allowed a generous increase
after a consideration of the husband's intelligence, education, refinement,
and experience.' 5 In still another case, arising in New York, additional
sums were allowed although the ex-husband was not employed in any gainful occupation and the value of his securities had fallen,'" but the rationale
thereof proceeded on the theory that as a reduction may be granted because of inability to make the payments, then conversely a subsequent
17
As none of
increase is in order if the financial situation warrants it.
these cases is strictly in point with the instant one, resort must be had to
fundamental principles.
Alimony was originally developed in the ecclesiastical courts for the
support of a woman after a divorce a mensa et thoro was granted, 8 a
situation presently akin to the separate maintenance allowance authorized
10 42 Ida. 29, 243 P. 827 (1926).
11 42 Ida. 29 at 38, 243 P. 827 at 829.
12181 Minn. 421, 232 N. W. 793 (1930).
13 There is irony In the fact that the court had to subsequently reduce the alimony because of decreased returns from the trust fund during the depression:
Erickson v. Erickson, 194 Minn. 634, 261 N. W. 397 (1935).
14 See Handsaker v. ttandsaker, 223 Iowa 462, 272 N. W. 609 (1937).
15 Farlee v. Farlee, 101 N. J. Eq. 111, 137 A. 648 (1927).
16 Faye v. Faye, 131 Misc. 388, 226 N. Y. S. 729 (1928).
17 See Weiner v. Weiner, 242 App. Div. 847, 275 N. Y. S. 177 (1934). A court may
balk against granting a reduction, however, if it feels the ex-husband, during his
lush days, failed to be prudent and to provide against lean times: David v. David,
146 Misc. 444, 261 N. Y. S. 456 (1932).
IS1 B1. Comm. 441.
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by statute when cause for living apart is found to exist.19 In all probability,
at inception, the courts were generous in fixing or modifying the amount
of that allowance because the wife had no choice other than a separation
and few women were afforded economic opportunities to permit of selfsupport. After such a decree, of course, the parties still remained husband and wife, so it was not regarded as improper to permit her to benefit
from any subsequent increase in her husband's wealth through a suitable
20
order increasing the alimony allowance.
In the modern period, however, absolute divorce is available to all who
possess adequate grounds,2 1 and economic conditions have changed to the
point where gainful occupation is open to all women except, perhaps,
those burdened with the care of young children.22 As the basic reasons
for alimony have substantially disappeared, a person who elects to secure
an absolute divorce should generally be entitled only to nominal damages
for breach of the marriage contract, 23 except in cases where the age or
24
condition of the health of the aggrieved party might call for more. The
one applying for an absolute divorce desires to reacquire rights relinquished at the time of marriage. Such a person ought, in turn, surrender rights gained by that marriage. Alimony ought not be treated as
a punishment, but as an attempt to meet an economic problem. If the
one who seeks the divorce cannot become self-supporting, then the burden
of supplying the necessities of life should rest on the guilty spouse rather
than upon the whole of society. But alimony should not be awarded for
the purpose of deterring the divorced spouse from seeking gainful em19 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 68, § 22.
20 DeBlaquiere v. DeBlaquiere, 3 Hag. Ece. 322, 162 Eng. Rep. 1173 (1830) : Lewis
v. Lewis, [1866] L. R. 1 P. D. 230: Magowan v. Magowan, [1921] 2 I. R. 314.
Argument on behalf of the plaintiff in the instant case to the effect that, as her
right to the increase would be unquestioned if she had received a decree for
separate maintenance, she should not be denied the same right as it was the defendant's misconduct which had forced her to seek an absolute divorce from him, was
answered, inferentially, by the adage that she had made her choice and had. to be
content with it. The court said that the station in life to which the defendant had
accustomed plaintiff at the time of the entty of the decree was "the station in life
in which he is bound to maintain her now." See 332 Il1. App. 586 at 598, 76 N. E.
(2d) 335 at 340. Italics added.
21 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 40, § 1.
22 The right of the ex-spouse to seek an increase in alimony to provide better
opportunities in a more desirable environment for the child of the divorced parents
is competently discussed in Foote v. Foote, 68 A. 467 (N. J. Eq., 1908). not officially
reported.
23 See Armstrong, "Alimony as Abetting Divorce," 12 Va. L. Reg. (N. S.) 611
(1927).
24 In Wern v. Wern, 171 Mich. 82, 137 N. W. 71 (1912), the court took into consideration the fact that the wife was continuously sick and unable to work as the
result of her husband's abuse. See also Rood v. Rood, 280 Minn. 33, 273 N. W. 337
(1937), where the ex-wife's tubercular condition necessitated her removal to
Arizona.
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ployment and becoming responsible for his or her own support.2 5 Faced
in that light, increases in alimony should be granted on precisely the same
ground as an original allowance, that is where the need is demonstrable.
They certainly ought not be made to turn on subsequent increases in good
fortune arising independently of the help or encouragement of the exspouse.
Miss C. L. SAMUELSON
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decision announced *in the recent case of Ziff v. Sandra Frocks, Inc.,'
lends further weight to the idea that statutory methods for the service
of notice to terminate a tenancy for non-payment of rent are not necessarily exclusive. The plaintiff therein sent a statutory five-day notice to
the defendant-tenant by registered mail informing it of the imminent
termination of the lease because of non-payment of the rent. Defendant
did not pay so, after due delay, the landlord began proceedings for possession. Although admitting receipt of the notice, defendant interposed
the defense that plaintiff's action lacked foundation because service of
notice by registered mail did not amount to compliance with statutory
requirements.2 The trial court granted plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment,3 and on appeal that judgment was affirmed. The operation of
the decision is limited, however, by the fact that the defendant admitted
receipt of the notice for a different result may well have been attained had
there been a factual, rather than a legal, dispute over the question of
service.4
Technical common law requirements with respect to making a demand
for rent have, fortunately, been changed by statute. Insistence thereon
can no longer be used as a defense to hinder or delay the modern and
25 There is evidence of such a public policy, at least as to periodic alimony, in the
provisions of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 40, § 19, which puts an end to the obligation to
pay if the recipient thereof should remarry. See also Banck v. Banck, 322 Ill. App.
369, 54 N. E. (2d) 577 (1944), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 276, and
Kahl v. Kahl, 330 Ill. App. 284, 71 N. E. (2d) 358 (1947).
1331 Ill. App. 353, 73 N. E. (2d) 327 (1947).

2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 80, § 10, provides: "Any demand may be made or notice
served by delivering a written or printed . . . copy thereof to the tenant, or by
leaving the same with some person above the age of ten years . . . and in case no
one is in the actual possession ... then by posting the same on the premises."
3 Ibid., Ch. 110, §§ 181, 259.15, and 259.16. permit the use of such motion in suits
for possession of land. It may not be used where complicated disputed issues of
title are concerned: Ward v. Sampson, 391 Ill. 585, 63 N. E. (2d) 751 (1945).
4 In that respect, see Barbee v. Evans, 220 Ill. App. 154 (1920).
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speedy summary proceeding for possession.5 But statutory specifications vary, so the reports indicate that the modern demand may have
to range from strictest compliance with statutory requirements for personal service to the merest satisfaction of the need for. communication
of the pertinent information. In general, however, these statutes designate
similar methods of service to those found in Illinois, to-wit: personal
service, substituted personal service on some proper person, or constructive service by posting on the premises.
Where the enumeration of methods is prefixed by words such as
"demand shall be made," or "'shall be served," or where service of notice
has been raised to the dignity of a summons, the provisions have been
said to be mandatory and, therefore, have excluded other possible methods.6
Under such circumstances, the imparting of actual knowledge but by different means will not suffice for it is the proof that the notice was conveyed
to the tenant by the prescribed method which governs.? In fact, it has
been said that to hold otherwise would nullify the intent of the legislature,
as there would be no need to detail specific methods if any would do. 8
Pursuant to this view, sending notice by registered mail is obviously insufficient.' Other illustrations of the severity of statutes of this character
may be observed, as where personal service of a true copy was held incopy,10 or where
effective because the statute required a "duplicate"
substituted personal service on a member of the family was treated as
being insufficient.11 Entry of appearance by the defendant does not cure
defects of an unauthorized service,12 so other suits have been defeated
where the notice was signed by improper parties 13 or where proof of
agency was lacking. 4 It is the letter, rather than the spirit, of the law
which is important in such situations.
Concord v. Callaghan, 161 Misc. 764, 293 N. Y. S. 391 (1936).
v. DeBruyn, 187 Misc. 1045, 65 N. Y. S. (2d) 591 (1946) ; People ex rel.
Morgan v. Keteltas, 12 Hun. 67 (New York, 1877).
5 Hotel
6 Small
7

Hyde v. Goldsby, 25 Mo. App. 29 (1887).

8 Carstenson v. Hansen, 107 Utah 234, 152 P. (2d) 954 (1944).

9213 W. Thirty-fifth Street v. Ruff, 152 Misc. 267, 273 N. Y. S. 233 (1934)
Hinkhouse v. Wacker, 112 Wash. 253, 191 P. 881 (1920). In Barbee v. Evans, 220
Ill. App. 154 (1920), the court emphasized the fact that the statute required
"delivery" of the notice to the tenant, but based its decision on the ground that
there was no proof that the envelope in which the notice was mailed was received
and opened within the time fixed by statute.
10 Lorch v. Page, 97 Conn. 66, 115 A. 681, 24 A. L. R. 1204 (1921).
11 Doran v. Gillespie, 54 Ill. 366 (1870).
But see contra:
12 Tierney v. Tierney, 4 N. J. Misc. 241, 132 A. 486 (1926).
D'Agostino v. Bernabel, 269 App. Div. 853, 56 N. Y. S. (2d) 35 (1945).
App. 263, 33 N. E. (2d) 897
13 Northern Trust Co., Trustee v. Watson, 310 Ill.
(1941), abst. opin.
14 Mesaba Construction Co. v. 46th St. Service Station, 68 N. Y. S. (2d) 751
(1947).
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Other statutes exist, however, where the permissive word "may" rather
than the mandatory word "shall" is used or where no suggested methods
of service are mentioned. Under such statutes, it is the fact of communication of notice which is important to accomplish the statutory object so
any successful means to gain that end will be deemed sufficient. 15 Under
this theory, service by registered mail is clearly effective upon a showing
that notice was received even though it was not an expressly authorized
manner of service. 6 In fact, one case has said that it furnishes a more
desirable method than substituted service which, at best, provides only
constructive notice.17
Under statutes of this character, the principal dispute has been as to
just how far a court may go in presuming that notice has been received.
A requirement for written notice presupposes there will be a delivery of
that notice even though the element of delivery is not spelled out, hence
merely reading the notice is not enough. 8 Absent a requirement for
9
written demand, however, verbal notice has been held sufficient.' The
giving of notice to one of two tenants in common is regarded as notice to
21
both,2" but if given by only one of the joint lessors the notice is ineffective.
When addressed to a corporate tenant, service on an officer or one apparently in charge of the premises has been22treated as tantamount to
personal service because of a duty to forward.
Most statutes provide for some form of substituted personal service,
as by leaving the notice with a person over a designated age or by posting,
22
in the event personal service cannot be had. If the recipient is the wife,
15 In re Bergin, 55 F. Supp. 32 (1944) ; Lynch v. Bernstein, 48 A. (2d) 467 (Mun.
Ct., D. C., 1946) ; North v. Kinney, 231 Iowa 951, 2 N. W. (2d) 407 (1942).
16 Semble, Speer v. Lancaster-Johnson Lumber Co., 214 Ala. 688, 108 So. 746
(1925) ; Candler v. Mitchell, 119 Mich. 464, 78 N. W. 551 (1899) ; Alworth v. Gordon.
81 Minn. 445, 84 N. W. 454 (1900). The headnote to an abstract opinion in Goroway
v. Sheley, 331 Ill. App. 181, 72 N. E. (2d) 632 (1947), would seem to support this

view.

17 Craig v. Hel, 47 A. (2d) 871 (Mun. Ct., D. C., 1946).
18 Seem v. McLees, 24 Ill. 193 (1860) ; Jenkins v. Jenkins, 63 Ind. 415, 30 Am. Rep.

229 (1878). The tender of notice is not a delivery thereof according to Snyder v.
Abel, 235 Iowa 724, 17 N. W. (2d) 401 (1945).
19 Gash v. Dairymen's League Cooperative Assn., 10 N. J. Misc. 1228, 163 A. 147
(1932) ; Poindexter v. Call, 182 N. C. 366, 109 S. E. 26 (1921). Oral notice may
likewise be sufficient if a provision in the lease requiring written notice may be
said to have been waived: Citizens' Bank Bldg. v. Wertheimer, 126 Ark. 38, 189
S. W. 361 (1916).
20 Grundy v. Martin, 143 Mass. 279, 9 N. E. 647 (1887) ; Glenn v. Thompson, 75
Pa. 389 (1874).
21 McNally v. Leach, 205 S. W. 82 (Mo. App., 1918).
22 Foreman v. Hilton Co., 280 F. 608 (1922) ; Garage Co. v. Grand Blvd. Rink, 153
Ill. App. 45 (1910) ; State (Facts Pub. Co., prosecutor) v. Felton, 52 N. J. Law 161,
19 A. 123 (1889).
23 Hardebeck v. Hamilton, 268 F. 703 (1920); Bell v. Bruhn, 30 Ill. App. 300
(1889) ; Shaw v. Edwards, 198 Okla. 79, 175 P. (2d) 315 (1946).
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father, 24 son, 25 or sister2 6 and the tenant admits receipt, he cannot be

heard to complain. But service has been treated as defective when the
notice was not received by the tenant from the wife, 27 or from a handyman around the premises but not residing therein, 28 on whom service was
had. The place of service is likewise generally unimportant for a tenant
cannot complain because the notice was given on premises other than those
demised,25 but where given at the business premises which were the subject of the demise, service has been declared insufficient under a statute
which fixed service at the usual place of abode.2 0 Advertising the demised
premises for rent does not satisfy, 31 but putting the notice through a
window in the tenant's home, not on the leased premises, was sufficient
when coupled with subsequent oral notification. 2 Posting notice where
no one was in actual possession at the time was treated as sufficient even
though it referred merely to the "premises now occupied by you.'"'3 It may
be said, therefore, that courts will usually endeavor to seek for some indication that knowledge of the notice has been conveyed rather than act
to defeat possessory actions because technical details have not been met.
On the specific point of mailing notice by registered mail, it should be
remembered that the reports are full of cases concerning a presumption of
receipt from the fact of stamping and mailing a letter. Like practically
every other presumption, however, this one is also rebuttable3 4 and may
give rise to a disputed fact to be determined by the jury.2 5 No such
dispute was possible in the instant case as defendant admitted receipt of
the registered letter, but even absent that acknowledgment it has been
held that service on the wife of the tenant supports a belief that the husband received the notice, 36 so it is likely that proof of delivery of
registered mail to such a person may suffice. The fact of service should,
24 Farnam v. Hohman, 90 Ill. 312 (1878).
25 Welch v. Keeran, 233 Iowa 499, 7 N. W. (2d) 809 (1943).
26 McSloy v. Ryan, 27 Mich. 110 (1873).
27 Snyder v. Abel, 235 Iowa 724, 17 N. W. (2d) 401 (1945).
28 Sankstone v. Moody, 136 Ill. App. 619 (1907).
29 Epstein v. Greer, 78 Ind. 348 (1881) ; Brunet v. Schulman, 177 So. 847 (La.
App., 1938); Wilson v. Barnes, 134 Wash. 108, 234 P. 1029 (1925); Kincaid v.
Patterson, - W. Va. -, 39 S. E. (2d) 920 (1946).
30 Hudson v. Birmingham Water Works Co., 238 Ala. 38, 189 So. 72 (1939).
31 Tuemler v. Latter & Blum, 188 So. 172 (La. App., 1939).
32Hodgins v. Price, 137 Mass. 13 (1884). The fact of service was left to the
jury, in Currier v. Grebe, 142 Pa. 48, 21 A. 755 (1891), because the tenant denied
knowledge thereof.
33 Consolidated Coal Co. v. Schaefer, 135 Ill. 210, 25 N. E. 788 (1890).
34 Barbee v. Evans, 220 Ill. App. 154 (1920).
35 Henderson v. Carbondale Coal & Coke Co., 140 U. S. 25, 11 S. Ct. 691, 35 L. Ed.
332 (1890).
36 Steese v. Johnson, 168 Mass. 17, 46 N. E. 431 (1897).
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of course, be proved by legitimate testimony consonant with the rules of
evidence. 37 Admission of the original notice into evidence affords no
support 38 for the burden is on the plaintiff to prove both that there was
adequate notice and that it was properly served. 9 But the Illinois statute
accepts the sworn return of the person serving the notice as at least
sufficient to provide prima facie evidence of facts therein stated4

1

so,

in the absence of contradiction, such a return showing service by registered mail should hereafter be enough.
While it may be safer to follow statutory suggestions, convenience will
sometimes dictate the use of other methods for giving notice of termination of tenancy. Definite proof of the receipt thereof will insure a successful action, but except for those jurisdictions where statutory provisions
possess mandatory effect, the use of other reasonable means should suffice
particularly where communication of the notice is not denied.
L. C.

MARRIAGE-OPERATION

AND

EFFECT

OF

TRAEGER

ANNULMENT-WHETHER

OR

NOT ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGE SERVES TO AUTHORIZE SUIT FOR
TORTS COMMITTED BY ONE SPOUSE ON THE OTHER DURING COVERTURE-

The question of whether a former wife may bring an action against her
former husband, after the marriage has been annulled for reason of his
fraud, for a tort committed by him upon her during coverture was raised,
for the first time, by the recent Massachusetts case of Callow v .Thomas.1
The parties in the case had been married in August, 1944. In November
of that year, the wife was injured in an automobile accident, caused by
the gross negligence of the husband, while she was riding as a passenger
in his car. On the petition of the wife, the marriage was subsequently
annulled because of the husband's fraudulent representations, made at
the time the marriage had been entered into, concerning the state of his
health. Shortly thereafter, the former wife began the instant action to
recover damages for the injuries sustained by her in the automobile accident, contending that, as the decree of nullity had effaced the marriage
ab initio, her cause of action was maintainable against her former spouse.
Despite the ingenuity behind this argument, the Supreme Judicial Court
Vennum v. Vennum, 56 Ill. 430 (1870) ; Ball v. Peck, 43 Ill. 482 (1867).
Lehman v. Whittington, 8 Ill. App. 374 (1880).
Failure to re39 Tolman v. Heading, 11 App. Div. 264, 42 N. Y. S. 217 (1896).
ceive a mailed copy of a notice which had already been served by adequate substituted service will not vitiate the latter: Davis v. Jones, 15 Wash. (2d) 572, 131
P. (2d) 430 (1942).
40 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 80, § 11.
1- Mass. -, 78 N. E. (2d) 637 (1948).
37

38
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held that the plaintiff could not recover, basing its decision on the rule that,
in cases of voidable marriages, things done and concluded during the
period of the supposed marriage will not be undone and reopened after
the decree of annulment. The opinion, however, carefully distinguished
between cases of void marriages where, due to a fundamental disability,
there is no marriage at the outset, and voidable marriages, which remain
operative until challenged.
There is a dearth of American cases on the general subject,2 but
what decisions there are appear, in the main, to buttress the proposition
that an annulment does not compIetely eradicate the marriage for all
purposes.' Thus, when applying for a marriage license, a former spouse
whose prior marriage has been annulled cannot claim that he has not
previously been married, but must acknowledge the earlier marriage
in the new license application. 4 Where the rights of third parties have
intervened, growing out of the voidable marriage, a subsequent annulment
thereof cannot be set up to defeat them.- An innocent wife who has used
her spouse's funds for her support during coverture cannot be made to
account for the use thereof at the time an annulment is being granted."
On the question of the legitimacy of issue born of an annulled marriage,
however, there is a divergence of opinion. One well-known text writer
states that children born under such circumstances are illegitimateJ and
the New York case of In re Moncrief's W,11

8

has also reached the same

conclusion, but there is authority for the contrary view9 and some states
apparently settle the problem by statutes expressly designed to protect the
rights of innocent children. 10
The question of the right to alimony, whether temporary or permanent,
has also been considered in conjunction with annulment proceedings. The
rule has been stated that alimony is not proper in such cases11 and quite
recently a New York court refused to sanction the collection of arrearages
in temporary alimony accruing under a separation order where, by subse2 As a general rule, torts committed during coverture are treated as being nonactionable even though divorce is subsequently obtained: Thompson v. Thompson,
218 U. S. 611, 31 S. Ct. 111, 54 L. Ed. 1180, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1153 (1910).
3 The court, in the instant case, lists the English decisions having any bearing
on the subject. They are not discussed, but they incline in the same direction as
the instant holding.
4 Factor v. Factor, 184 Misc. 861, 55 N. Y. S. (2d) 183 (1945).
5 Williams v. State, 175 Misc. 972, 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 968 (1941).
6 Huffman v. Huffman, 51 Ind. App. 330, 99 N. E. 769 (1912).
7 Bishop, Marriage and Divorce, § 690.
s235 N. Y. 390, 139 N. E. 550, 27 A. L. R. 1117 (1923).
9 Titsworth v. Titsworth, 78 N. J. Eq. 237, 78 A. 687 (1910).
10 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 40, § 4, and Ch. 89, § 17a.
11 Annotations on the subject appear in 4 A. L. R. 926 and 110 A. L. R. 1283.
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quent decree, the marriage was declared null and void. 12 Other courts,
however, have held that the granting of temporary alimony is a matter
calling for discretionary treatment," and in one case a husband who had
agreed, as part of a divorce proceeding, to pay alimony until his ex-wife
remarried, was ordered to recommence payments upon the annulment of
the ex-wife's subsequent marriage. 14 It is not possible, therefore, to be
dogmatic on the point as to whether or not, upon annulment, the prior
marital status is expunged for all purposes and to be treated as if it
never existed.
Courts do recognize a right of action in tort for fraud and decit favoring the former spouse who has been induced to enter into a marital relationship by false representations. In one such case, that of Cohen v. Kahn, 5
the court stated that, in the eyes of the law, "there never was any marriage contract between the parties. Under the circumstances I do not see
how the plaintiff could be bound by the common law limitation against
one spouse suing another for tort."1 6 But it is not clear, from the opinion
therein, whether the tort on which the action was predicated was deemed
to have been committed at the time the consent to marry was obtained,
or whether it continued throughout the period of coverture. If the former,
that view is not at war with the reasoning upon which the instant case
was decided. But if the tort was considered as one occurring during the
period of the supposed marriage, it is submitted that the principle there
1 7
promulgated is too broad for general adaptation.
Relation back, in cases of annulment, is a fiction adopted in order
to achieve justice. It should not be applied mechanically and blindly in
every situation. Especially is this true with respect to voidable marriages.
Such marriages will exist indefinitely unless challenged by an interested
party. When so challenged, they may be obliterated as to the future but,
12 Saunders v. Saunders, 63 N. Y. S. (2d) 880 (1946).
13 Arndt v. Arndt, 331 Ill. App. 85, 72 N. E. (2d) 718 (1947) ; Hart v. Hart, 198
Ill. App. 555 (1916).

14 Sleicher v. Sleicher, 251 N. Y. 366, 167 N. E. 501 (1929). The opinion indicated
that the ex-husband was not liable for payments accruing during the existence of
the marriage which was later annulled, deeming it inequitable that the wife should
have two means of support at the same time, hence it would seem that recission
of a marriage is not without such bounds as may be prescribed by policy and
justice. See also such related problems as the right to claim a pension after annullment, illustrated by People ex rel. Byrnes v. Retirement Board, 272 Ill. App.
59 (1933), and the same issue, with regard to workmen's compensation, discussed in
Southern By. Co. v. Baskette, 175 Tenn. 253, 133 S. W. (2d) 498 (1939).
15 177 Misc. 18, 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 847 (1941).
16 177 Misc. 20, 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 847 at 848-9.
17 A tort committed prior to marriage is deemed discharged by the subsequent
marriage of the parties before judgment has been pronounced: Gottliffe v. Edelston,

[1930] 2 K. B. 378. See also note 2, ante.
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as Chief Justice Cardozo observed in the case of American Surety Com8
pany v. Conner,"
decrees of annulment cannot "obliterate the past and
make events unreal."c" It would be manifestly fanciful for courts to apply legal principles rigidly, for blind espousal of bare principle is apt to
lead to bad law. The reasonableness of the approach manifested in the
instant case results, therefore, in an intelligent holding.
M. J. COLANGELO

NUISANCE-PRIVATE

NUISANCES-WHETHER

OR

NOT BUSINESS

PRO-

PRIETOR'S USE OF SIDEWALK AS WAITING PLACE FOR CUSTOMERS CONSTITUTES

AN ENJOINABLE PRIVATE NUISANCE--In the recent Florida case of Shazmhart
v. Morrison Cafeteria Company,' the plaintiff, a drugstore owner, brought
an action against the defendant, an incorporated cafeteria proprietor, to

enjoin a nuisance and to recover damages. The facts showed that at
the period of the noon and evening meals, customers of the cafeteria formed
lines on the sidewalk which frequently resulted in the virtual closing of
the entrance to the plaintiff's drugstore against his patrons for long
periods of time. The main defenses were that the defendant did not cause
the lines to form and, even if it did, it was the exclusive duty of the
police to regulate the use of the public streets. Upon consideration of a
master's report recommending relief as prayed, the chancellor dismissed
the bill declaring there was no basis for injunctive relief. When taking
jurisdiction on direct appeal, however, the Florida Supreme Court reversed the decision and ordered that relief be granted.
A business man whose premises abut upon a sidewalk or highway
may make such use thereof as the needs of his business require, but there
is a definite limitation upon this right, to-wit: the use must be reasonable
in regard to the needs of the public or to those of other individuals such
as adjoining owners. 2 This commonly approved doctrine has been applied
in cases where a purely physical obstruction of the sidewalk exists 3 and

there would seem to be a close analogy between the use of the sidewalk
as a storeroom for one's personal property and the use thereof as a waiting room for one's customers. But in a situation where the queue constitutes the obstruction, it is not as easy to see a causal connection between
the defendant and his customers. As the defendant, in this instance, does
not manually place each person in the queue, for the customers form lines
upon their own volition free from any direct physical control of the
1s251 N. Y. 1, 166 N. E. 783, 65 A. L. R. 244 (1929).
19 251 N. Y. 1 at 9, 166 N. E. 783 at 786.
1- Fla. -, 32 So. (2d) 727 (1947).
2 Callanan v. Gilman, 107 N. Y. 360, 14 N. E. 264 (1887).
3 Johnson Chair Co. v. Agresto, 73 I1.

App. 384 (1897).
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defendant, the problem is really one of determining to what extent the
defendant may be said to indirectly control the formation of the injurious queues.
Some cases dealing with this problem have found a causal connection
to exist when the defendant has been guilty of an unjustifiable commission
in the operation of his business.' The question has arisen, for example,
because the defendant there concerned had maintained highly sensational
window displays which attracted throngs of people to view the same.
As these crowds served to obstruct the means of access to the premises
of others, suits were brought to secure relief. In each instance, the
court was called upon to determine whether or not the defendant was connected with the obstruction so as to make him liable for creating and
maintaining a nuisance. The general holding was that if the natural and
probable result of the defendant's sensational acts would be to cause a
crowd to collect, he would be liable. But these decisions go no farther
than to attach liability when the defendant has been guilty of unjustifiable
or unnecessary positive conduct.
In the case of Barber v. Penley and that of Lyons & Sons v. Gulliver'
the foregoing method of determining causal connection was carried one
step farther, so as to be made available in case of an unjustifiable omission. The defendant in each of those cases operated a theater and theatergoers queued up for an hour or so prior to the evening performance. It
was declared that the queues were a nuisance which the defendants had
brought about by wrongfully refusing to open their doors earlier so as
to allow people to wait inside, a method which would have kept the sidewalks clear. In the first of these cases, the courts said: "As regards the
defendant's suggestion that he could not help it, if in point of fact the
nuisance exists which is caused by the defendant, not with an object to
cause that nuisance, but by reason of the entertainment he carries on and
to which he invites the public to come, it is a case in which he must either
'
discontinue his performance, or the nuisance must be prevented. ' If
the word "business" were substituted for the word "entertainment" in
the broad rule there announced, that rule would apparently cover all
possible situations, and would remove the limitation that some kind of improper conduct must be shown.
4 Rex v. Carlile, 6 Car. & P. 636, 172 Eng. Rep. 1397 (1834), unusual prints
and figures; Elias v. Southerland, 18 Abb. N. Cas. 1266 (New York, 1886). women
combing their hair in a show window to advertise a hair restorative; Jacques v.
National Exhibit Co., 15 Abb. N. Cas. 250 (New York, 1884), puppet show several
times daily; Green & Green Co. v. Thresher, 235 Pa. 169, 83 A. 711 (1912), unusual display of woman's undergarments.
5 [1893] 2 Ch. 447.
6 [1914] 1 Ch. 631.
7 [1893] 2 Ch. 447 at 459.
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But if there was ever any doubt that the English rule was based
solely upon some form of wrongful conduct or omission, such doubt has
been swept away by the case of Dwyer v. Mansfield.8 The facts therein
show that the defendant, a merchant, had a license from the Ministry
of Food to sell fruit and vegetables and, since an acute potato shortage
existed, he was ordered to sell but one pound of potatoes to each customer. Neighboring shopkeepers brought an action~to recover for damage
caused by the daily line-up. The judge, denying recovery, there declared:
"Even if a nuisance had been established, that would not suffice since the
plaintiffs must prove that the nuisance was due to an act which was unlawful, or the doing of something which was unnecessary or unreasonable,
therefore unjustifiable. I am satisfied that it was the short supply of
potatoes that caused the queues to collect and the short supply was not a
matter for which the defendant was liable."'

Even though the decision

seems to have been forced upon the court by abnormal economic conditions, it is the law in England.
In the only other comparable case of this kind found in this country,
that of Tushbant v. Greenfield's, Inc.,10 the Supreme Court of Michigan
was also confronted with a queue obstruction case wherein the defendant
had been guilty of no unjustifiable positive conduct but lines extended from
the defendant's cafeteria so as to block the entrance to, and view of,
plaintiff's store. The court found it was necessary to draw an analogy
from the physical obstruction cases and, by so doing, achieved the result
that there had been an unreasonable use of the sidewalk. It evidently
experienced no difficulty in establishing a connection between the defendant and its customers, so the court sustained a mandatory injunction which
required the defendant to employ someone to supervise the lines in order
to allow unobstructed entrance to the plaintiff's store. A dissenting justice
therein, however, indicated that he could not see how it would be possible
to ask the defendant to do more than to honestly seek police action, as
a private person has no right to regulate other users of a public sidewalk."
The Supreme Court of Florida, when deciding the case under discussion, relied strongly upon this Michigan case and also considered the
theater cases aforementioned, but the court did not limit in any way the
general principle that if the natural and probable result of one's business
is to attract lines of customers, thereby impairing another's right of ingress
and egress, injunctive relief may be had. That it arrived at a fair and
8 [1946] 1 K. B. 437.
9 Ibid., at p. 442.
10308 Mich. 626, 14 N. W. (2d) 520 (1944).
11 The police argument was also advanced in the cases referred to in notes 4
to 8, ante, but has never received judicial affirmation and has only served as the
basis for a dissenting opinion.
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just decision seems evident for it would be an alarming decision indeed
that would allow another's right of access to his property to be taken
away under the cover of his neighbor's business ingenuity.
Where one maintains a profitable nuisance he should not complain
when asked to take reasonable steps to prevent injury arising therefrom.
The expense of abating the nuisance should properly fall upon him and
he should not be allowed to pass it on to the taxpayers by insisting that
only the police shall have the power to regulate his waiting customers. After
all, the persons comprising the nuisance are not strangers to such a defendant, but are his own patrons whom he knowingly invites to come to
his premises even if that may mean a long wait upon the sidewalk. Considered in this light, it is hardly conceivable how a closer connection between a defendant and a wrong could be shown. Although the law in
England may allow an innocent business man, under unusual circumstances, to drive his neighbors into bankruptcy, it is comforting to know
that this practice will not be passively commended in this country.
H. J. JENNINGS

RELEASE-CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION-WHETHER OR NOT RELEASE,

GIVEN TO ONE TORT FEASOR AS TO COMMON LAW LIABILITY, OPERATES TO
RELEASE ANOTHER FROM CAUSE OF ACTION GROWING OUT OF VIOLATION OF
"DRAM SHOP" STATUTE-The controversial question as to whether or not
the Illinois Liquor Control Act' creates a separate and distinct cause of ac-

tion which would remain unimpaired, even though there has been a release
of a common-law right of action for personal injuries growing out of the
same situation, was considered in the recent case of Manthei v. Heimer-

dinger.2 The appellant therein filed his complaint against a tavern operator
and the owner of the building in which the tavern was located, predicated
on the statute, for injuries arising out of an automobile accident occurring
when the car in which he was a passenger was struck by another driven
by one Kerch. He alleged that the tavern operator had caused Kerch to
become intoxicated, hence claimed that the defendants were liable under
the statute. Appellees defended on the ground that appellant had executed
and delivered a general release to Kerch and the insurer of Kerch's car
covering the accident in question. The trial court sustained appellees'
contention that such general release had operated to extinguish appellant's
right of action under the statute and dismissed the suit. The Appellate
Court for the Second District, on appeal, affirmed that ruling, holding
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947. Ch. 43, § 94 et seq. Section 135 thereof provides for the
maintenance of actions for damages caused by intoxicated persons.
2332 IMi. App. 335, 75 N. E. (2d) 132 (1947).
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that whether or not the several wrongdoers were joint tort-feasors was
relatively unimportant, it being enough that all were liable for the same
indivisible injury arising out of a single accident, and the familiar rule
that the release of one tort-feasor serves to release the other tort-feasors
had to be applied.
There being no Illinois case squarely in point, the appellant found it
necessary to rely on the Minnesota case of Philips v. Aretz 3 to sustain his
position. In that case, the plaintiff's father, having become intoxicated by
liquor sold to him by the defendant, a dram shop keeper, was subsequently
killed by an automobile. The administratrix of the deceased executed a
release in favor of the operator of the car, and a portion of the proceeds
of that settlement was set aside for the benefit of the minor plaintiff. In
a subsequent action by the minor against the dram shop keeper to recover
damages for the death so arising, the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that the Wrongful Death Act 4 and the Liquor Licensing Act 5 were remedial
enactments unknown to the common law, wholly unrelated in scope and
purpose, and permitted separate recoveries. The court there stated,
in part, "We think, and so hold that recovery here is allowed not for a
tortious wrong but as a means of enforcing the penalty imposed on the
dealer by statute .. .'
The court in the instant case rejected the principle underlying the Minnesota decision as being inapplicable because in the
suit before it the supposedly several claims were not based on different
statutes but rather consisted of a claim predicated on negligence at common law as well as under the Liquor Control Act, hence really amounted
to a single indivisible cause of action. That result was achieved by regarding the statutory remedy as one designed to compensate the injured person for the damage sustained rather than as a means of enforcing a penalty
imposed on the liquor dealer by statute, so that, once compensation had
been received, all claim under the statute was gone.'
Many factors militate against the decision so reached. It seems rea3 215 Minn. 325, 10 N. W. (2d) 226 (1943).
54, 7 N. W. (2d) 403 (1943).
4 Minn. Stat. 1941, § 573.02.

See also Mayes v. Byer, 214 Minn.

5 Ibid., § 340.12(4).
6 See syllabus 5, by the court, 215 Minn. 325, 10 N. W. (2d) 226 (1943).
The
court further held that defendants could not escape liability on the theory that
the liquor dealer, who furnished decedent with liquor contrary to law, and another
who drove his car so as fatally to injure decedent were joint or concurrent tortfeasors.
7 It is clear that a release given to one tort-feasor will absolve others involved in
the same wrong and subject to the same form of action, Mooney v. City of Chicago,
239 Ill. 414, 88 N. E. 194 (1909), on the assumption that the money paid was received as "full compensation" for the injury sustained and any attempt in the release to reserve a claim against the others would be void as there would then be
nothing to reserve: 45 Am. Jur., Release, § 39.
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sonably apparent from the original title of the act" and its present broad
scope that the primary purpose thereof was to control the traffic in alcoholic beverages. The legislation was enacted pursuant to the police power
of the state, and created a separate and distinct right of action not
previously known." The benefit thus conferred on those injured by the
conduct of intoxicated persons was clearly an incident to the general
scheme for such injured persons already had a right of action against the
primary wrongdoer at common law, and to provide an additional right
of action could serve no rational purpose unless it would be to punish
the liquor dealer for his statutory breach. Actions brought under the
remedial provisions of the act are not predicated on negligence, but upon
the violation of the statutory duty."0 The two-year statute of limitations
does not apply, as it would to actions for personal injuries sounding in
tort," nor does the monetary limitation imposed on actions for wrongful
3
death 2 affect the amount of the possible recovery under this statute.'
4
Contributory negligence, generally, is not a defense,' although where the
injuries complained of were sustained by the intoxicated person, the
reverse may be true.' 5 Clearly, then, the right of action under the statute
is readily distinguishable from any remedy conferred by the common
law.
If further emphasis of that fact is necessary, it is provided by the
language of the Appellate Court for the Second District, in the case of
Hyba v. Horneman, Inc.,16 where the court declared that civil damage
statutes with reference to keeping dram shops are "similar in purpose

and therefore have a general similarity in their terms and provisions.
Their evident object is to punish those who furnish means of intoxication
by making them liable in damages caused thereby. ' 17 The court further
stated, "Therefore we find the two acts [the Dram Shop Act and the
Injuries Act] to be separate and distinct, and that the rights created
8 The title to the first statute, R. S. 1874, p. 438, was "An Act to provide for
the licensing of and against the evils arising from the sale of intoxicating liquors."
The present statute, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 43, § 94 et seq., is simply entitled "An
Act relating to alcoholic liquors."
9 O'Connor v. Rathje, 368 Ill. 83, 12 N. E. (2d) 878 (1937).
10 Douglas v. Athens Market Corp., 320 Ill. App. 40, 49 N. E. (2d) 834 (1943).
11 O'Leary v. Frisbey, 17 Ill. App. 563 (1885).
12 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 70, § 1.
13 O'Connor v. Rathje, 368 Ill. 83, 12 N. E. (2d) 878 (1937).
14 Thompson v. Hogan, 309 Ill. App. 413, 33 N. E. (2d) 151 (1941); Hyba v.
Horneman, Inc., 302 Ill. App. 143, 23 N. E. (2d) 564 (1939) ; Spousta v. Berger,
231 Ill. App. 454 (1923).
15 Hill v. Alexander, 321 Ill. App. 406, 53 N. E. (2d) 307 (1944) ; Kopp v. Benevolent Order of Elks, 309 111. App. 145, 33 N. E. (2d) 161 (1941).
16 302 Ill. App. 143, 23 N. E. (2d) 564 (1939).
17302 Ill. App. 143 at 145, 23 N. E. (2d) 564 at 566. Italics added.
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thereby do not rest on the same basis. .

.

. The right of recovery under

each appears to be separate and distinct and in no way founded upon or
governed by the rights of recovery under the other. .

.

. This permits

of but one conclusion, that they are independent actions, and hence the
one can not be considered as exclusive of the other."18 Three years later,
the Appellate Court for the Third District, in the case of Meyers v. Young
Mens Christian Association of Quincy Illinois,1 9 also pointed out that there
is "no connection between the common law right of action in tort and
the specific statutory liability created under the Dram Shop Act ...
Their purposes and remedies are different. In a proper case both causes
of action may be pursued independently, and the satisfaction of one would
not abate nor affect the right of action under the other."20
It is difficult, in the face of this language, to reconcile the reasoning
in the principal case, for it not only rejects the rationale of the Hyba
case, decided in the same district, and the confirmatory ruling of the
Third District in the Meyers case, but does so without commenting on
either. 21 Instead, it looks to the wording of a decision by the Appellate
Court of Indiana pronounced twenty-eight years ago to support the result
here achieved.22 By failing to reverse its own holding or to distinguish
its own language, the court leaves the law of Illinois in a state of turmoil
and indecision.
It is not anomalous to find a statute designed to force an industry to
bear the expense of the injuries it fosters, irrespective of the negligence
or lack thereof of its individual members.2 1 If such a statute displaces a
common-law remedy, it is not unreasonable to expect that the injured
person should be limited to the statutory substitute, hence be restricted
in the amount he can recover thereunder. But when such has been the
case, there is evident language in the statute to show the existence of such
a limitation, a provision compelling an election between the old and the
new remedy, or else some compulsory form of subrogation in favor of the
one who, by the statute, is forced to pay for the injury over against the
18302 Ill. App. 143 at 146, 23 N. E. (2d) 564 at 567.
19 316 Ill. App. 177, 44 N. E. (2d) 755 (1942).
20 316 Ill. App. 177 at 189, 44 N. E. (2d) 755 at 760.
21 A possible explanation may lie in the fact that Justice Dove wrote the opinion
in the instant case and it was concurred in by Justices Wolfe and Bristow, whereas
the court, at the time the Hyba case was decided, consisted of Justices Pearce,
Huffman and Hill.
22 Brown v. Kemp, 71 Ind. App. 281, 124 N. E. 777 (1919). That case held that
the basis of an action on a liquor dealer's bond sounded in tort, and the tort-feasor
rule applied. To the same effect is American Surety Co. of New York v. Souers,
50 Ind. App. 475, 98 N. E. 829 (1912).
23 See, for example, the Workmen's Compensation Act, 11. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch.
48, § 138 et seq., and the Occupational Diseases Act, ibid., § 172.1 et seq.
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person really at fault.' 4 In such situations, the intent that the injured
person may have but one recovery is obvious. By contrast, provisions of
this character are absent in the Illinois Liquor Act, hence there is no
foundation for any inference that the legislature designed the dram shop
proceeding to be either an exclusive or a substitute remedy for the injured person. Legislative failure, in over three-quarters of a century,
to act to revise or modify the statute to make that inference clear can
only support the contrary inference that such was not the legislative
desire. If it was not, then the courts should not attempt to make it so by
wavering judicial interpretation.
C. J. PRATT

24 Such is the case in matters of workmen's compensation: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947,
Ch. 48, § 166. See also Campbell, "Subrogation under Workmen's CompensationToo Much or Too Little," 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 225-47 (1940).

